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Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas 
MacArthur in the Philippines: 
There Must Be a Day of Reckoning 
Kerry Irish 
Abstract 
In 1935 Major Dwight Eisenhower accompanied General Douglas MacAr-
thur to the Philippines, where MacArthur was tasked with creating a Philip-
pine army capable of defending an independent Philippines. Eisenhower's 
odyssey in the American colony (1935-39) left him with a deep and indelible 
negative impression of MacArthur. Historians have disputed the cause and 
depth of the rift. Ike's disagreements with MacArthur were more philosophi-
cal than personal and concerned two significant issues: building an army in 
a developing but still impoverished country, and the leadership qualities that 
an American army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates. 
The dispute and resulting antipathy lasted the rest of their lives. 
I n 1935, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower was serving in the War Department 
as an aide to U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. By fall 
of that year MacArthur had been appointed to the new position of Military 
Adviser to the Philippines. His task was to create a Philippine army capable 
of defending the island nation once independence, planned for 1946, had been 
achieved. MacArthur, impressed with Eisenhower, virtually insisted that the 
major accompany him to the Islands. Eisenhower went, albeit reluctantly, and 
would spend the next four years in a difficult and ultimately frustrating job. 
Dr. Kerry Irish is professor of American history at George Fox University in Newberg, Or-
egon. He is the author of Clarence C. Dill, 1he Life of a l#stern Politician. His article ''Apt Pu-
pil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan" appeared in 1he journal 
of Military History in January 2006. More recently, he authored a chapter on Eisenhower and 
his cross-cultural leadership during World War Two in 1heArtofCommand: Military Leader-
ship from George Washington to Colin Powell. He is working on a biography of Eisenhower up 
to 7 December 1941. 
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Eisenhower's sojourn in the Philippines with MacArthur left him with a deep 
and indelible negative impression of the general.1 Ike's disagreements with 
MacArthur were more philosophical than personal. The dispute was engendered 
over two significant issues.The first was how to build an army in a developing but 
still impoverished nation; exacerbating that disagreement was a deep difference 
over the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit, and 
endeavor to develop, in his subordinates. 
Historians have differed over the years as to whether the conflicts between 
Eisenhower and MacArthur in the Philippines resulted in lasting ill feelings and 
estrangement, or were the normal irritations of two strong-minded men and were 
largely forgotten as the years passed. A large group of highly regarded historians 
have taken the latter view. Ike's son, JohnS. D. Eisenhower, takes perhaps the most 
charitable view of the disputes between his father and MacArthur. He wrote, "I 
do not believe that everything he [Ike] said in those pages [Ike's diary] represents 
his lifetime views of Douglas MacArthur." John Eisenhower largely followed D. 
Clayton James, who in 7he Years of MacArthur, volume 1, 1880-1941, notes the 
heated words over the Philippine parade incident of 1938, but asserts that the 
disagreements between the two men have been, as Eisenhower himself claimed, 
"exaggerated." James goes on to emphasize the mutual respect they had for one 
another. John Gunther argues that there was "no real split at that time [Ike's 
Philippine tour]." Stephen Ambrose has written a comprehensive account of the 
MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship, but Ambrose's assessment is perhaps the 
most disappointing. In a passage that clearly summarizes the entire relationship, 
Ambrose argues that the descriptions of conflict and animosity are overdone and 
simplistic; the two men had a "rich and complex" relationship. He takes at face value 
Eisenhower's later assertion of a "strong tie" to MacArthur. But in the following 
chapter on the Philippines, Ambrose forgets these comments and allows that the 
friendship had ended when Eisenhower left the Philippines. Geoffrey Perret in 
Eisenhower notes some of the disputes but charitably describes both men as victims 
of circumstance and the macro forces of history. Perret also wrote a biography 
of MacArthur before his Eisenhower work. In that volume Perret describes the 
relationship as strained but still respectful; Eisenhower especially was careful to stay 
on good terms with MacArthur. When Ike lambasts the general in his diary, it is 
because of strain and exhaustion. Richard Connaughton explains the differences 
between the two men by emphasizing the diverse nature of their military education, 
and their vastly different personalities. He accurately notes, however, that their clash 
was in the context of the difficult problem of creating the Philippine defense force. 
Nevertheless, their animosity may not have been permanent.2 
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, interview by D. Clayton James, 29 August 1967, p. 2, Eisen-
hower Library (EL), Abilene, Kansas. 
2. John S.D. Eisenhower, General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence (New York: Free Press, 2003), 
28; D. Clayton James, 7he Years if MacArthur, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Miffiin 
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Another significant group of historians have argued that the relationship was 
permanently damaged during the Philippine years, but there is little agreement 
as to the cause of the animosity. Carlo D'Este describes some of the arguments 
between Ike and MacArthur, but ascribes their lasting estrangment to their mutual 
frustrations in building the Filipino army and their diverse personalities. Matthew 
Holland recognizes that the relationship between Eisenhower and MacArthur had 
been broken; he places the blame on MacArthur but does not go into great detail. 
Peter Lyon's Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero accepts Ike's assertion that after the 
parade incident "our relationships were never really close." Steve Neal agrees with 
Lyon. William Pickett correctly notes that Ike's experiences with MacArthur resulted 
in their "essential estrangement." In Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, Carol 
Petillo writes that in the Philippines, "seeds of their future rivalry and distrust had 
been sown, and a certain coolness in their relationship could be noted."Mark Perry 
assesses the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship in Partners in Command, a dual 
biography of Eisenhower and George C. Marshall. Perry argues that Eisenhower's 
Philippine years were agonizing and the antagonism between Ike and the general 
grew steadily worse. Perry claims that MacArthur was particularly "keen to build up 
the Philippine military," a comment that would have caused Eisenhower's temper 
to flare. He observes that in later years Eisenhower was polite to MacArthur, but he 
had little use for his old commander. In Ike the Soldier Merle Miller takes the view 
that there was certainly a "rift" between the two men that never healed, and that 
MacArthur was largely responsible because he believed the rumors that Eisenhower 
was angling for his job through certain influential Filipinos and never forgave Ike. 
Miller also asserts that Ike had had enough ofMacArthur. Piers Brendon's generally 
acerbic tone served him well in assessing the MacArthur-Eisenhower dispute. He 
argues that the animosity between the two men was deep and lasting. In The Far 
Eastern General Michael Schaller describes MacArthur's jealousy of Eisenhower's 
relationship with Philippine President Manuel Qyezon. The general's subsequent 
belief that his subordinate was angling for his job was "fatal" to their relationship. 
Michael Korda also notes that the enmity between the two men was serious and 
lasting but sheds little light on the reasons. Indeed, he inaccurately writes that 
MacArthur "never hesitated to let Ike get on with things, and never second-guessed 
him."In an early biography ofMacArthur, Clark Lee and Richard Henschel strongly 
argue that the ill feelings between Ike and MacArthur were permanent and stemmed 
from the Philippine years. In American Caesar William Manchester suggests the 
parade incident cooled the MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship and the passing 
Company, 1970), 526, 564, 565; John Gunther, Eisenhower: 1he Man and the Symbol (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1951), 65; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of 
the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 93, 94, 117, 118; 
Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 126-30; Geoffrey Perret, Old 
Soldiers Never Die: 1he Life of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Random House, 1996), 212-16, 
268,501, 502; Richard Connaughton, MacArthur and Difeat in the Philippines (New York: Over-
look Press, 2001), 75-85,230, 231. 
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years only hardened their opinions. For Manchester the two men were incapable of 
understanding one another. MacArthur dismissed Eisenhower's accomplishments 
in World War II because Ike had not commanded troops in the field; Eisenhower 
criticized MacArthur's interference in political matters and supported President 
Harry S. Truman when he fired MacArthur in 1951. MacArthur once wrote of 
Eisenhower that he was like a younger brother; Manchester observed it was "more 
like the feeling Cain had for Abel." Manchester notes MacArthur could not abide a 
subordinate who had risen to the heights Eisenhower had in the postwar world. 3 
The foregoing is a brief summary of the scholarship on this issue. In order to 
understand the Eisenhower-MacArthur animosity, it is necessary to take a brief 
look at the careers of the two men before the Philippine years, to understand the 
relationship between the United States and the Philippines in the 1930s, and to 
grasp the essentials of the American effort to help build a Philippine defense force. 
MacArthur, still a relatively young man, became army chief of staff in 1930. 
In November 1929, as the stock market crashed, Eisenhower went to work for 
Major General George Van Horn Moseley in Washington. His job was to create 
the first full industrialization and mobilization plan the nation had ever possessed. 
His superb work garnered the attention of the chief of staff, who soon stole Ike 
from Moseley.4 Eisenhower worked for MacArthur in Washington in some of 
the darkest days of the Great Depression. The army budget was attacked as was 
the army itself in these deeply isolationist years. MacArthur fought to save what 
he could of the army. Ike thought that MacArthur may have erred in trying to 
save military personnel as opposed to equipment. But then he conceded that the 
general was probably right given that cutting deeply into personnel would have 
had a negative impact on morale.5 Nevertheless, Ike's analysis of the situation and 
3. Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Lift (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 239, 240, 254, 
255; Matthew Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 188; 
Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1974), 81-82; Steve 
Neal, 1be Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 
1978), 102-3; William B. Pickett, Dwight David Eisenhower and American Power (Wheeling, 
Ill.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1995), 27; Carol Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: 1be Philippine Years 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 191; Mark Perry, Partners in Command: George 
Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 7, 49, 50, 
373-74; Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As 1bey Knew Him (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987), 
290; Piers Brendon, Ike His Lift and Times (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 69, 
70, 77; Michael Schaller, 1be Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 40, 
57-66; Michael Korda, Ike: An American Hero (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 207, 
220, 607; Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1952), 98, 99; William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 173,689,273,478,438,648,530. 
4. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 108, 110. 
5. Chief of Staff Diary, 3 April1933, in Eisenhower: 1be Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 
1905-1941, ed. Daniel Holt and James Leyerzapf (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998), 250. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
his preference for equipment over men was a foreshadowing of the view he would 
take in the Philippines when the defense budget came under attack there. Strong-
minded men both, MacArthur and Eisenhower had other disagreements in these 
Washington years, none more pointed than MacArthur's decision to personally lead 
American soldiers against the so-called Bonus Marchers in 1932. Ike did not think 
the chief of staff should be leading troops through the streets ofWashington.6 Nor 
did Ike appreciate the army's seniority system for promotion. He preferred a merit-
based system. MacArthur still liked the old way, arguing it kept favoritism out of 
the equation. Eisenhower acknowledged that, but thought it kept talent out of the 
equation as well? These disagreements certainly raised Eisenhower's consciousness 
regarding the man for whom he worked. But they cannot be said to mark the 
estrangement that is so evident in the later Philippine years. Ike was too much the 
realist, too level-headed, to let the promotion issue become personal. On the same 
page of his diary that reflects his disagreement with MacArthur over promotions, 
he strongly asserts his respect for the general's abilities, and his personal affection for 
MacArthur. Indeed, he remarks that MacArthur preferred the seniority system not 
out of malice to anyone, but rather, after long consideration of the subject, as "the 
lesser of two evils. "8 
In June 1933,Ike was offered a position with the Public Works Administration. 
He told MacArthur about the offer but was relieved when MacArthur"emphatically 
refused." Eisenhower, clearly pleased that the general would not part with him, 
wrote "so that's that!" "I am glad I am staying with the General. "9 When their 
service together in Washington ended in 1935, Eisenhower knew the general, like 
all men, was flawed, but he still respected him. That was not the case when Ike left 
the Philippines in 1939.10 
In 1935 MacArthur, whose term as chief of staff was soon to end, was 
designated the Military Adviser to the Philippine Government, the head of the 
American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands. His task was to create a 
Philippine defense force that could defend the islands once independence had 
been gained from the United States in 1946. Since the end of the Spanish 
American War in 1898, the Philippines had been an American colony, and an 
American governor-general had headed the civilian government. When the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934, the Americans created the Philippine 
Commonwealth and declared their intent to free the Filipinos in twelve years. 
MacArthur and Eisenhower, along with a small staff, arrived in the Islands in 
6. Dwight Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (Garden City, N .Y.: Doubleday & 
Company, 1967), 216. 
7. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Dia-
ries, 226, 230. 
8.lbid. 
9. Chief of Staff Diary, 2 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries, 
252. 
10. Ibid. In the Chief of Staff Diary, 8 June 1934, note the respect with which Eisenhower 
describes MacArthur's fight for the army budget. 
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Douglas MacArthur and staff arriving in the Philippines, October 1935; Dwight 
Eisenhower is the third from the left in the row of men behind MacArthur. 
[Courtesy of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas] 
October 1935. Even then, American military leaders were glancing nervously 
toward the Land of the Rising Sun.11 
Faced with the monumental task of building a Philippine defense system 
from virtually nothing in 1935, MacArthur allowed Ike to choose another officer 
to help him create the Philippine defense plan. Eisenhower chose perhaps the 
best man for the job, the man who would contribute most to the team. Major 
James B. Ord was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower's. Raised in Mexico, 
Ord spoke fluent Spanish, the Philippines' language of business and politics. The 
bespectacled and corpulent Ord was an energetic, sophisticated, and well-read 
man. He was attached to the Army War College where he chaired the Philippines 
Defense Planning Committee. Ord's committee had already started work on the 
Philippine defense plan.12 He and Eisenhower continued working on it even as 
they prepared to leave Washington in the fall of 1935.13 
11. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 43-47. 
12. Ibid., 63, 64. 
13. Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippines Islands, 27 December 1935, 
in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 293, 294. 
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Unfortunately, Ord and Eisenhower were ill-informed of the limitations of 
both money and talent in the Philippines which would dictate later revisions. 
Those revisions meant substantial reductions in the officer corps, in professional 
enlisted men, and in armaments and munitions. Eisenhower was typically reserved, 
if nonetheless prescient, in his judgments of the plan at this point. Both he and 
Ord told MacArthur that reducing the Philippine defense budget from 22 million 
pesos to 16 million wpuld make the creation of a credible defense difficult "because 
of the lack of professional personnel."14 
MacArthur's Mission was not the only element of the American army in the 
Philippines. Since the Spanish American War the U.S. Army had maintained a 
sizable contingent in the islands known as the Philippine Department. Headed 
by Major General Frank Parker, the department had been instructed to cooperate 
with the Mission.15 Unfortunately that cooperation was often withheld. Most 
American officers believed the effort to create a viable Philippine army was 
"ridiculous," while some feared that such an army might turn on its creator.16 
Among those who derided the effort, racism was common. Americans were not 
unaware of the average Filipino's fighting qualities; indeed, many Americans 
admired the Filipino soldiers who served in the Scouts, the Philippine segment 
of the American armyP But most Americans doubted that Filipinos could 
adequately command an army. MacArthur and Eisenhower held more progressive 
views.18 Making matters worse, the High Commissioner of the Philippines, Frank 
Murphy, was opposed to the entire purpose of the MacArthur Mission, and often 
thwarted the development of Philippine defense capability. Murphy was a pacifist 
who believed the Philippines were indefensible.19 
Eisenhower bemoaned the lack of cooperation between the Mission and 
the Philippine Department. He could not understand why the War Department, 
whose officers held many of the same beliefs as the Philippine Department, did 
not see the wisdom of cooperating with the Mission in creating a Philippine army. 
In his diary he chided the War Department: 
The Tydings McDuffie Act [the law that mandated independence 
in 1946] so clearly contemplates the employment of the Philippine 
Army by the President of the United States, in the event of a 
14. Ibid., 295. 
15. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, i.n Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 308; 
Ricardo T. Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942 (Manila: Manila University Press, 1992), 40. 
16. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
307; Brian Linn, Guardians of Empire: 1he US Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 240. 
17. Edward Coffman, 1he Regulars: 1he American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 339; Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die, 197. 
18. Diary entry, November 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,. 
287; Diary entry, December 1935, in ibid., 292; Diary entry, 8 October 1937, in ibid., 363. 
19.J. Woodford Howard, Mr. justice Murphy: A Political Biography (Princeton, N.J.: Princ-
eton University Press, 1968), 104-9. 
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national emergency, that we believe the War Department could 
make a definite effort to develop the strength and efficiency of this 
military adjunct. For the next ten years complete responsibility 
for Philippine Defense resides in the American government, 
and since weakness in the local defenses would involve extreme 
embarrassment in the event of war, it seems to us to be the part 
of wisdom for the American government to take positive and 
appropriate action in the matter.20 
Lack of support from the American army would form but one of the problems that 
brought Eisenhower and MacArthur into conflict. 
The purpose of the revised defense plan remained "to assure the maximum 
local protection of the various islands."21 Because the Philippines could afford 
only a token air force and no modern navy, each island would have to supply the 
recruits who would defend it. The army would engage in a "cordon defense" of each 
island; that is, the Philippine army would attempt to defeat an attacking force at 
the beaches behind an established line of defense. Eisenhower did not believe 
that such a defense, essentially a desperation defense, could stop a determined 
modern army supported by air and naval forces.22 Although MacArthur also 
made pronouncements about American responsibility to defend the Philippines, 23 
he became increasingly confident that given time, he could create a significant 
Filipino force that would cause any enemy to undertake a cost benefit analysis 
that would conclude that the Philippines were not worth the trouble.24 In the 
meantime, the United States would, MacArthur was sure, increasingly help with 
Philippine defense. As we shall see, it was this belief, in the face of considerable 
evidence to the contrary, combined with MacArthur's unwarranted optimism 
regarding the creation of the Philippine army, and his lackadaisical and misguided 
efforts to improve it, which would form the nexus of the conflict between himself 
20. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
307. 
21. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
294. 
22.1bid. 
23. D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, 236, 237. 
24. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Dia-
ries, 294; Address to the faculty and student body of the Command and General Staff School 
at Baguio, Philippine Islands, 3 August 1936, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, by Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New 
York: Praeger, 1965), 101-10; H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: 1he United States and the Philip-
pines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 168; Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: 1he Philippine 
Years, 56; Eisenhower, At Ease, 230; Charles H. Bogart, "The Doomed Philippines Inland Seas 
Defense Project," journal of the Council on America's Military Affiirs 14, no. 1 (1986): 39; John 
Whitman, "MacArthur's Generalship: A Bad Decision Unredeemed, MacArthur's Decision to 
Defend Luzon's Beaches," Valley Forge]ourna/6, no. 1 (1992): 2, 3. Whitman contends that Mac-
Arthur continued to overestimate the ability of his Philippine army in the early days ofWorld 
War II, a miscalculation which led to the poor defense of the Philippines. 
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and Dwight Eisenhower. MacArthur refused to countenance the possibility that 
his assumptions could be in error.25 1hen, as time passed, he seemed to place less 
emphasis on the American element of his plan and more on the Philippine. 
The Philippine defense plan featured nearly 1,000 professional officers and 
7,000 enlisted men around whom would be raised substantial reserve units to be 
called to active duty as needed. The professional soldiers would be largely engaged 
in training the reservists. Beginning in 1941,20,000 reservists were to be trained 
every six months, 40,000 per year.26 1hese reservists were to be drawn from the 
male population at the age of twenty and would be available for service for thirty 
years. They would serve for ten years in the "Hrst Reserve" and then pass into 
the "Second Reserve."27 1hus the Philippines would have a 400,000-man reserve 
army ten years from the time the plan was fully implemented. 28 Graduates of the 
new Philippine "West Point" at Baguio would gradually augment the professional 
officer corps. Eisenhower took particular interest in this school as he knew the 
army would be only as good as its officers. The Philippine defense planners initially 
envisioned an air force of fifty bombers and thirty other aircraft. They hoped 
these planes would inflict inordinate damage on any fleet brave enough to invade 
Philippine waters and would also facilitate transportation between the various 
army outposts. The Philippine army was to be cheaply supplied with obsolete 
American weapons and equipment.29 
Most of 1936 was to be used in building the necessary infrastructure and 
training facilities for the army. Starting from virtually nothing, the original plan 
called for training only 6,000 recruits in 1937.30 The buildings, equipment, trained 
instructors, and money to train more men were simply not available. 31 
The new Filipino army was to incorporate the existing Philippine Constabulary, 
the 6,000-man national police force. This consolidation would save money and 
enhance the police force while giving the army a base from which to build.32 
Eisenhower found that there were men of ability in the Constabulary, but they 
had little experience "in the administration oflarge organizations."33 1he Filipino 
25. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 67. 
26. Memorandum For General MacArthur, 15 June 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisen-
hower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 312; Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 52. 
27.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,35. 
28. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 60. 
29. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
294; Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands, 20 January 1936, in ibid., 
304; Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 301; Diary entry, 6 February 1936, in ibid., 305; Diary 
entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307. 
30. Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
309. 
31. Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 309; 
Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 300. 
32. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 52; Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 51. 
33. Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
301. 
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army was to have one regular division and eventually thirty reserve divisions. The 
Mission also organized a command structure for the Filipino army to be fleshed 
out with Filipino officers.34 These men would not be under MacArthur, who 
commanded no one but his own staff. He was the military adviser to President 
~ezon, nothing else. 
Once the recruits had been inducted, their training was to take place near 
their homes, in keeping with the manner in which these soldiers would serve in an 
emergency. There was no transportation to move large bodies of men from place 
to place in either peace or war. The reserve units had to be trained and deployed on 
their home islands.35 This necessitated a large number of induction and training 
centers. The defense plan initially called for the creation of ten divisional districts, 
each with thirteen "training cadres" that would handle the training of 155 men 
each year or about 78 per class, two five-and-one-half-month classes per year. 
Mobilization centers were also needed, about fifteen per division.36 
In late December 1935, a gloomy Eisenhower lamented the Mission's lack 
of progress. Eisenhower, generally optimistic, initially had high expectations for 
the Philippine army. Reality was sobering. Ike encountered significant problems 
in virtually all areas, including his commander. Difficulties loomed as the year 
came to an end: The Philippine Gerneral Staff, whose job it was to flesh out the 
basic defense plan, oversee recruiting, and codify army regulations, had yet to 
take shape.37 If these problems were not addressed soon, Eisenhower anticipated 
delaying the scheduled April 1936 registration of manpower. Ike noted in his 
diary that both he and Ord had: 
learned to expect from the Filipinos with whom we deal, a minimum 
of performance from a maximum of promise. Among individuals 
there is no lack of intelligence, but to us they seem, with few 
exceptions, unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative 
and executive procedure. When any detail is under discussion, they 
seem to grasp the essentials of the problem, and readily agree to 
undertake accomplishment of whatever decision may be arrived at in 
conference. But thereafter it is quite likely that nothing whatsoever 
will be done. Moreover it often develops that the decision itself 
has not really been accepted by them, even though at the time they 
appeared to be in full agreement. The whole matter must then be 
gone over again. These peculiar traits we are learning to take into 
account, but obviously they impede. progress.38 
34.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,36,37,38. 
35. Ibid., 35, 36, 37. 
36. Memorandum for General MacArthur, 15 June 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisen-
hower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 313; Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 35, 36. 
37. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 
296,297. 
38. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in ibid., 297. 
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If progress were to be made, a general staff had to be chosen. In January 1936 O!te-
zon finally made Jose de los Reyes, a former lieutenant colonel in the Constabulary, 
the chief of staff. Eisenhower quickly gave the new General Staff responsibility for 
creating the regulations of the army. Some progress was made, but Eisenhower was 
still uncertain that the induction machinery would be ready by April. Eisenhower 
and Ord were not happy with de los Reyes; by May 1936, MacArthur had secured 
the appointment of Major General Paulino Santos as his successor. 39 
One of the most difficult problems Eisenhower faced was to find men who 
could train the recruits. About 240 enlisted men from the Philippine Scouts received 
special training at Fort McKinley, the headquarters of the Philippine Department 
near Manila, and were then assigned as instructors for the Philippine army, but more 
were needed.40 Graduates of the academy at Baguio would not have an impact for 
four years. Meanwhile, a Reserve Officers Service School (ROSS), the graduates of 
which would help train the inductees, was also inaugurated at Baguio.41 
Another reason for the Mission's lack of progress was that the United States simply 
did not know what to do with the Philippines.1his problem arose almost immediately 
after Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1898, remained 
unresolved through the 1920s, and was exacerbated by the Great Depression which 
increased the financial straits under which the United States and thus the U.S . .Afmy 
operated. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was a step toward resolution but it was 
by no means the final move. The United States was ostensibly committed to defending 
the islands for at least ten years, but both its army and navy were unsure how to defend 
the Philippines; indeed, many in both services were doubtful if they could, or should, 
defend the archipelago at all. Worse, those who assumed the islands must be defended 
tended to disagree as to how that defense might best be accomplished. Obviously, 
those who thought that the Philippines would be expendable should a major Pacific 
war occur were not about to support MacArthur's Mission; they deemed it foolish 
to put money and materiel into an indefensible outpost. Then too, there were those 
who would defend the islands but were opposed to arming the Filipinos for fear that 
they might turn against their American masters. Finally, some American politicians 
supported the basic idea of MacArthur's Mission but simply could not find the 
rationale to place it higher on the priority list. Philippine Department officers shared 
many of these views. No wonder Eisenhower and Ord felt as if they were the Robinson 
Crusoe and his man Friday of the U.S. Army-cast away on a Pacific island and largely 
forgotten--even by their commander.42 For the team-oriented Eisenhower this was 
maddeningly frustrating; MacArthur was more inclined to rely on MacArthur. 
39. Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 301,·305, 310. 
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41. Ibid., 59, 60; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington: Office of the Chief 
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 12, 13. 
42. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 48-52, 90-92; Linn, Guardians ofEmpire, 219-21, 
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The first substantive crack in the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship appeared 
when the two men disagreed over what should be done about the lack of progress 
in the Mission's work, especially as that failure was due to poor cooperation from 
the War Department in particular and the United States in general. Eisenhower 
early recognized that the promised support for the Mission's work was simply not 
forthcoming. He believed that there was both ignorance and miscommunication 
involved in the impasse. Education was the answer and the teacher must be 
perhaps the grandest American military figure of the era: Douglas MacArthur. 
For Eisenhower time was crucial: MacArthur must return to Washington in 
1936 and explain to officials the defense problems in the Philippines. Moreover, 
MacArthur could, Eisenhower was sure, obtain favorable clarification of the 
order to the Philippine Department mandating cooperation with the Mission. 
Although Major General Lucius Holbrook had just assumed command of the 
Philippine Department with orders stating "assistance to General MacArthur was 
the most important peacetime mission of your command, "43 Eisenhower saw the 
Philippine Department as obstructionist and had little confidence that the change 
of commanders there would make a difference. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur to 
speak to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig and his civilian superior: 
Jimmy [Ord] and I believe that if this whole matter were clearly 
explained to the American Chief of Staff and Secretary ofWar, that 
very substantial and effective assistance would be forthcoming.44 
For Eisenhower assistance would manifest itself in the form of weapons with which 
to arm the Filipino army: even obsolete weapons would give the Philippines a 
chance to defend themselves and inexpensively facilitate the American defense of 
its colony.45 But MacArthur refused to go to Washington in 1936. Ike was disap-
pointed that his boss would shirk responsibility for the development of Philippine 
defense at this crucial time; incredibly, MacArthur seemed more concerned about 
his promotion to field marshal in the chimerical Philippine army than American 
support for the Mission. Instead of traveling to Washington, MacArthur ordered 
Eisenhower to prepare a paper that would explain to the War Department the 
"efficiency and soundness of the Philippine Defense Plan, and the idea that the 
and MacArthur's purpose in creating the Philippine army was to surreptitiously keep the Philip-
pines indefinitely subservient to the United States as a manifestation of American Empire. This 
interpretation does not bear scrutiny, and it certainly was not Eisenhower's view. For Eisenhower, 
Philippine reliance on the United States for defense was the only logical strategic option in a 
dangerous world, not a Qy.ezon-MacArthur plot to keep the Philippines a colony. For a recent 
interpretation of this untenable view, see Richard B. Meixsel, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas 
MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth," 
Pacific Historical Review 70, no. 2 (2001): 255-92; Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and 
Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 372. 
43. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 9. 
44. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 
307. 
45. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307. 
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American War Department should cooperate efficiently toward its development."46 
MacArthur did not personally seek more U.S. assistance until the spring of 1937. 
Clearly MacArthur did not perceive the same lack of progress, the same level 
of threat to the Philippines that Eisenhower did. Moreover, to MacArthur, the 
symbol of having a field marshal as the man responsible for Filipino defense was 
worth much in terms of motivation and cooperation in the Philippines. Eisenhower 
did not fully appreciate this view. He saw weapons as a greater priority. At the 
base of this burgeoning disagreement was the notion, gradually taking hold of 
MacArthur's mind, that the Filipinos could one day defend themselves.47 1his 
opinion was in keeping with MacArthur's analysis of what an aggressive Japan 
might do. In a speech to the Command and General Staff School at Baguio in 
August 1936 he said: 
In the case of the Philippines, it would be an impossibility for any 
potential enemy to bring to the Philippine area anything like a 
preponderant portion of his army. He would indeed have difficulty 
in concentrating into the vital area as large a force as the Philippine 
Army which would oppose him. Any conceivable military force 
might actually find itself outnumbered.48 
MacArthur even suggested that the island nature of the Philippines would help in 
its defense. He seems to have discounted the advantage of the mobility a modern 
industrial power would have in taking the Philippines, mobility the Filipinos would 
not have. 49 MacArthur added later in the speech, "when the Philippine Defense 
Plan had reached fruition, it will represent a defensive strength that will give hesi-
tation to the strongest and most ruthless nation in the world." Finally, he asserted 
the Philippines not only could thwart such a nation on its own but it must do so: 
If the Philippines does not prepare for its own defense, to maintain 
its own security and to preserve its own independence, how are 
these functions to be performed? If others are not to perform these 
functions for the Filipinos, certainly they must gird themselves for 
the task.50 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower was convinced that the Filipinos could not defend them-
selves without significant American aid, far more aid than was forthcoming, aid that 
would provide some basis in reality for MacArthur's grandiose vision. 51 It may well 
be that both men were a bit delusional: Eisenhower concerning the amount of help 
that might be secured from the United States, MacArthur regarding the capacity of 
the Philippines to defend itself, and his assessment of Japanese strategic logic. 
46. Diary entries, 6 February, 1 March, and 29 May 1936, in ibid., 305,308,310. 
47. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 95. 
48. MacArthur, A Soldier Speaks, 101. 
49. Ibid., 101. 
50. MacArthur, A Soldier Speaks, 110. 
51. Eisenhower, At Ease, 224; Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisen-
hower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 307. 
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Eisenhower's frustration with progress on the defense plan came to a head 
at the same time as his dispute arose with MacArthur over the general's decision 
to accept field marshal rank in the Philippine army. Eisenhower could not quietly 
abide this manifestation of MacArthur's ego. The decision seemed full of self-
importance at the cost of more efficient defense. Unbeknownst to Eisenhower 
at the time, MacArthur had negotiated this promotion with Qyezon before 
accepting the job as Military Adviser.52 But in early 1936, it appeared that 
Qyezon was offering the promotion. Indeed Eisenhower, Ord, and Captain T. J. 
Davis (MacArthur's aide) were also to receive promotions and commissions in the 
Philippine army. Ike convinced Ord and Davis that accepting these promotions 
would hinder the Mission's success. 53 Eisenhower confronted MacArthur, saying, 
"General you have been a four-star general . . . This is a proud thing. Why in 
the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshalship?" But the 
general "just gave me hell. "54 A seething Ike wrote in his diary: 
In the first place, we [Eisenhower, Ord and Davis] believe that in 
a locality where we are serving with so many American officers, 
most of whom believe that the attempt to create a Philippine Army 
is somewhat ridiculous, the acceptance by us of high rank in an 
Army which is not yet formed would serve to belittle our effort. 
Moreover, it would seriously handicap every effort on our part to 
secure necessary cooperation from commanders and staffs in the 
American Army. Secondly, we believe that in dealing with the 
Philippine Army Headquarters our position is unassailable as long 
as we purport to be nothing but assistants to the Military Adviser. 
If, however, we should accept military titles in the Philippine Army, 
the authority and soundness of our advice would be measured, in 
the minds of the Philippine Army officers, by the rank held. We 
believe this would create an anonymous [anomalous?] situation and 
would handicap our efforts to assist, advise, and direct the efforts of 
Army Headquarters and subordinate officials. 55 
Here is Eisenhower's concern for the impact that a particular action might have 
on the cooperation between the Philippine Department and the Philippine army, 
and between the Mission and the army it was trying to create. For Eisenhower, 
MacArthur's action would hurt the building of an effective team and a strong alli-
ance. MacArthur hoped that his new rank would inspire the Filipinos to defend 
their islands. But for Eisenhower, any action which hurt the creation of an effec-
tive team was contemptible. This idea, so much a part of Eisenhower's World War 
52. Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 2. 
53. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries, 
306. 
54. Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero, 81. 
55. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf,Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries, 
306,307. 
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II philosophy, did not come to him 
in the early days of that conflict, 
but was derived from his days as a 
football player at West Point and a 
coach of army football teams in the 
1920s, and most important, from 
his mentor Fox Conner.56 Eisen-
hower's Philippine sojourn, how-
ever, was crucial in the seasoning of 
this philosophy in that it allowed 
him to test his team concept in the 
real world of competing military 
branches and departments, political 
infighting in his own government, 
and in relations with a foreign cul-
ture and government. 57 MacArthur 
simply failed to live up to what 
Eisenhower thought an American 
army officer should be. 
There was also a significant 
difference between Eisenhower 
and MacArthur regarding work 
ethic. The Amdrican army in the 
Philippines, and indeed most 
foreign posts, had developed a 
T J Davis, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight 
Eisenhower in dress uniform, Malacanang 
Palace, Philippine Islands (Courtesy of the 
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, 
Kansas] 
lackadaisical attitude toward work. Eisenhower had run into this disturbing 
tradition in Panama in the early 1920s and made himself somewhat unpopular 
because of his insistence that officers take their jobs seriously.58 The American 
army in the Philippines may have been still more lackadaisical. One lieutenant 
colonel, writing in 1910, remembered fondly: ' 
This post [Fort William McKinley] is like a big country club. A 
little work in the morning. Golf, polo, tennis, riding in the hills in 
the afternoon. The Club at sunset. Dinner in the evenings. A lazy 
man's paradise.59 
56. Stephen Ambrose, 1he Supreme Commander: 1he War Years of General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 55, 56. Ambrose cites his 
interview of Eisenhower, 11 October 1967. 
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The standards of the Philippine Department had hardly changed in twenty-five 
years. MacArthur, perhaps because he saw himself as semi-retired, fit right in.60 
Eisenhower had to stand in the gap because of MacArthur's absences, accepting 
responsibilities that would not normally be his. Among the duties MacArthur 
shirked was meeting consistently with O!Iezon. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur 
to meet with President O!Iezon at least once per week to secure agreement on the 
myriad details facing the Mission, but the general refused. Eisenhower surmised 
that MacArthur believed such meetings were beneath him.61 Clearly Eisenhower 
believed the Mission was suffering because of MacArthur's ego, the opposite of the 
team approach that Ike favored. While Eisenhower sometimes enjoyed a leisurely 
afternoon playing bridge, there were long periods of intense work in the brutal 
tropical climate. 62 In MacArthur's absence, Ike, Ord, and the staff "had to run 
much of the routine business."63 MacArthur and Eisenhower drifted apart as the 
Mission struggled on. 
Disputes between Eisenhower and MacArthur ranged over a wide array 
of topics. Some, like the development of the Philippine army, were issues they 
could affect if not completely control; others were entirely out of their spheres of 
influence. In the summer of1936 they argued over Kansan AlfLandon's chances in 
the presidential election. MacArthur, citing a Literary Digest poll, believed Landon 
would win in November. Eisenhower, a Kansan with friends in his hometown of 
Abilene who kept him apprised of politics and a host of other local topics, thought 
Landon would not even carry his home state. Listening to one of MacArthur's 
monologues on the election, Eisenhower disagreed with the general over Landon's 
chances. MacArthur exploded, nearly hysterical; he blasted Eisenhower, who was 
dumbfounded at this response. Then MacArthur let slip that he had informed 
O!Iezon to shape his plans for a visit to the United States on the basis of a Landon 
victory. In November 1936, Eisenhower was proved correct and MacArthur had 
to "back pedal" to O!Iezon. But the general never apologized to Eisenhower. Ike 
though the entire incident "most ridiculous. "64 
The registration of twenty-year-old Filipino men went forward as planned in 
April1936. The registration far exceeded O!Iezon's hopes; the president was proud 
60. Even D. Clayton James admits MacArthur kept light office hours. Richard Connaugh-
ton is less circumspect. James, 1he Years of MacArthur, 557; Arthur Nevins Oral History Inter-
view, 23 April1970, p. 7, OH 119, EL; Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 72; Eisenhower, At 
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of his Filipino brothers.65 Qyezon decided, so MacArthur told Eisenhower, to 
draft and train the full 20,000-man contingent beginning in January 193 7. 66 1he 
20,000 figure was the target number for a fully operational training system. The 
defense plan did not envision reaching that number until1941.67 In fact, under 
the original plan only 3,000 recruits were to be called inJanuary.68 
When MacArthur informed Eisenhower of the decision to train 20,000 
recruits at the beginning of the year, Eisenhower was incensed. He explained to 
MacArthur there was no money to build the training infrastructure for so many 
recruits, there was no money to pay them, and there were too few instructors 
to train them. In fact, the sites for the training camps had not been selected. 
Eisenhower even had doubts that 20,000 recruits could be fed. Then MacArthur 
launched into Eisenhower with one of his venomous tirades, a show Eisenhower 
had already seen all too often.69 MacArthur and Qyezon were thinking in terms 
of"generalities"; it was Eisenhower's and Ord's job to take care of the details. 70 
The "details" were daunting. The 1936 defense budget was already gone; the 
money for the construction of training facilities awaited special funding from the 
National Assembly. Even that request did not envision training 40,000 men in 1937. 
Eisenhower estimated the overall cost of the additional men to the ten-year plan at 
10 million pesos, more than one year's budget. Ike knew what real training required. 
He had significant experience training soldiers, even officers, in World War I. 71 
MacArthur's program seemed all about show, little about substance.72 But what 
could Eisenhower do? MacArthur and Qyewn, it seemed, were of one mind; there 
was nothing left but to do one's duty. Then too, the general still had some impact on 
Eisenhower's imagination. Ike later remembered, "General MacArthur's amazing 
determination and optimism made us forget these questions [expense and efficacy 
of the defense program] at times, but they kept corning back in our rninds."73 
65.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,55. 
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Eisenhower's frustration grew over the development of the training program 
and the way his boss led the Mission. Ike noted in his diary that the "hasty way 
we went at the job [out of necessity given the MacArthur decision to train 20,000 
men in January] boosted costs, which, even without the aggravation [of training 
more men] are much higher than we originally estimated."74 Moreover, most of 
the camps lacked adequate water, roads, and light. A weary Eisenhower lamented, 
"most of our stations will not be ready for receipt of recruits in January. "75 He and 
Ord remained convinced the plan "emphasizes strength and numbers too much 
at the expense of efficiency."The training offered at the camps would be far below 
the quality Eisenhower deemed essential, and the cost would overwhelm the 16 
million peso budget. Ike again took these problems to MacArthur. This time the 
general acknowledged the cost overruns, but preferred to pressure Qlezon to 
come up with the money. Eisenhower was to plod ahead with the program. 76 
The military training provided during the five-and-one-half-month program 
was necessarily shallow. 771his was due in part to the lack of funds, but also because 
the recruits had to be taught so much more than soldiering. Half of them were 
illiterate so the army endeavored to teach them rudimentary reading skills. There 
were also courses on sanitation; nevertheless, 52 recruits died of disease in the first 
half of 1937. One observer wrote: 
General MacArthur, must have his tongue in his cheek when he 
sounds off about them or else he does not visit the training camps. 
I have visited a few here in the provinces. The state of affairs is 
indescribable. They put a poor miserable third lieutenant, with at 
the most six months training, in charge of several hundred of these 
savages who have never known a moment's restraint nor discipline 
in their lives ... they have no common language, it was quite 
impossible. 78 
As Eisenhower had feared, there were not enough qualified instructors. Neverthe-
less, over 19,000 trainees "graduated" in May 1937.79 
In the summer of 1937, Eisenhower inherited Ord's responsibility for the 
Philippine army budget while Ord was in Washington, D.C., attempting to 
garner greater cooperation from the United States in building Philippine defenses. 
Eisenhower, concerned since the beginning that the defense plan emphasized 
sheer numbers over quality and efficiency, pointed out to MacArthur that the 
budget provided only 1 million pesos for mobilization equipment such as tents 
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and mess kits. 80 An alarmed MacArthur surprised Eisenhower with an order 
to add 3.5 million pesos to the budget for such equipment. Failure to supply 
recruits with these implements, MacArthur intoned, would "defeat his whole 
plan."81 Eisenhower, surprised by MacArthur's impractical reaction, !'objected 
strenuously" to the added expense. He wondered where he might find the money 
and what the implications for training would be. Ike was not opposed to the 
decision on the basis of merit; the army should always have been supplied with 
such equipment, and trained fewer men. But now MacArthur was demanding a 
quick reorientation of the budget without commensurate savings. MacArthur met 
Eisenhower's objections with the view that this budget change was imperative for 
psychological reasons. Eisenhower then reworked the budget to save 1.5 million 
pesos. In presenting the new plan, Ike warned MacArthur that the potential for 
running out of funds and being forced to lay off recruits and officers before the end 
of 1938 was real.82 Meanwhile, Eisenhower requested mobilization equipment 
from the United States.83 
Unfortunately for all concerned, the mobilization equipment dispute was 
minor compared to the fact that the Philippine army was simply out of money by 
mid-1937.84 Nor could the principals take comfort in the midst of the budget crisis 
in the hope that the world would leave the Philippine Islands alone, enjoying an era 
of peace and prosperity while moving sonorously to independence. The Philippines 
were precariously located on the fringe of shifting empires and thus were an inviting 
target.85 In July 1937, the Japanese invaded northern China, involving that unhappy 
land in both a civil war and a war against a modern imperial nation. The Philippines 
were far too close to the Land of the Rising Sun to rest easily. 
The Philippine army sought a special appropriation from the National 
Assembly in the summer of 1937 to cover its deficit. Meanwhile Eisenhower, 
with Ord still in the States, set out to write a 1938 budget that would pay for 
MacArthur's defense plan. Eisenhower's final figure was 25 million pesos, 9 million 
more than the figure MacArthur had promised Qyezon in 1935.86 In discussing the 
defense plan with the general over the previous months, Eisenhower consistently 
asserted that there was not enough money. MacArthur assured Eisenhower that 
world conditions, the Filipinos' desire for early independence, and perhaps money 
from the United States would all work in favor of the new budget; if not, he 
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would demand more money from the Filipinos.87 Ord, having returned to the 
Philippines in the fall, told Qyezon of the new budget. Qyezon was apoplectic 
and confronted MacArthur who feigned ignorance of the escalating costs. 88 The 
next day MacArthur called a conference of his aides; Ord, Eisenhower, Davis, and 
Bonner Fellers, who was to report to Qyezon, attended. MacArthur asserted he 
had never authorized a budget over 16 million pesos, and that the new budget 
made him look like "a fool or a knave."89 MacArthur continued the tirade, 
accusing his staff of"'arguing technicalities' to defeat the conceptions of the high 
command."90 However, the primary cost problems were MacArthur's decision to 
train the full40,000 men in 1937, and the general's grand desire to have a reserve 
army of thirty divisions.91 As MacArthur ranted; Eisenhower seethed. Later that 
same day he wrote: 
I've got to decide soon whether I can go much further with a 
person who, either consciously or unconsciously, deceives his boss, 
his subordinates and himself (probably) so incessantly as he does. 
I wonder whether he believes there is one atom of truth in his 
statements of this morning. I wonder whether egotism, exclusive 
devotion to one's own interests (in this case a 66,000 Peso salary, plus 
penthouse and expenses) can finally completely eliminate a person's 
perception of honesty, straightforwardness, and responsibility to 
the Philippines for whom he is working. 
Having confronted the human condition in his relationship with MacArthur, 
Eisenhower considered his future: 
For some months, I've remained on this job, not because of the 
General, but in spite of him. I've got interested in this riddle of 
whether or not we can develop a W.D. [War Department] and 
an army capable of running itself, and I prefer to dig away at it to 
being on a "mark time" basis somewhere else. But now I am at a 
cross road. If the Marshal is to persist in his arbitrary methods, and 
is going to make things as unpleasant, if not impossible as today's 
homily indicated, then I'm for home. We should be able to get 
a better line on the situation within a few days! Right now I am 
disgusted and in something of a temper, a bad state of mind in 
which to make any decisions. 92 
Here in these passages are many of the qualities of mind that Eisenhower admired 
in an army officer: the elevation of duty above one's own interests, willingness to take 
responsibility for problems or failure, and determination to make hard decisions 
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and to make them in a calm and objective manner, not on the basis of theories or 
wild imaginings. MacArthur, for Eisenhower, was the opposite of what a leader 
should be.These personality traits were already well established in Eisenhower, but 
his island sojourn with MacArthur emotionally and powerfully imbedded them still 
deeper in his mind. Ike knew there was little sense of"team'' in the Mission, or in the 
relationship between the Mission and the U.S. Army, still less between the United 
States and the Philippines. MacArthur had indelibly impressed upon Eisenhower, 
through negative example, the necessity for a commander to accept responsibility 
for his actions and decisions. MacArthur could not admit to mistakes and so blamed 
aides when he made them. This MacArthurian character trait was often on Ike's 
mind while in the Philippines. In writing Lucius Clay's efficiency report in 1938 
Eisenhower noted, "Willingly assumes responsibility.'>93 Moreover, MacArthur 
would dramatically repeat the lesson before Eisenhower left the Philippines. 
The general now found himself in an uncomfortable position. He had denied 
the realistic budget to Qyezon, and verbally bludgeoned his aides over it. But 
the crisis was real, and MacArthur could not escape it in his penthouse or at the 
movies, a pastime he so enjoyed. 94 In spite of the fact that he would appear to be 
a functionary of his aides, at some point he decided to use all of the arguments he 
had rehearsed in front of Eisenhower to convince Qyezon that the new budget 
was necessary. The president would have been a "fool or a knave" if he had not now 
entertained doubts about his military adviser.95 
Qyezon, as egotistical and ambitious as MacArthur, was neither fool nor knave. 
But he too was faced with a difficult choice: disavow MacArthur and stick with the 
original plan, or ask the National Assembly for more money using MacArthur's 
arguments. Qyezon would need a compelling argument for the Assembly, some 
of whom believed the whole plan was wrong-headed, that the Philippines were 
indefensible. MacArthur and Qyezon turned to Eisenhower to draft the speech. 96 
This was no surprise; if one quality could be singled out in explaining how 
Eisenhower had made a name for himself in the U.S. Army, it was his ability to 
think and write clearly. In the 1920s he had written the Guide to American Battle 
Monuments in France for General John J. Pershing when others had failed; in the 
early 1930s he had written the nation's first comprehensive industrial mobilization 
plan for General Moseley. Again, others had failed. This stellar work brought him 
to the attention of Chief of Staff MacArthur, who soon put Eisenhower to work 
on numerous writing projects, including his annual report.97 Now Ike set out to 
convince the Filipino legislature to increase the defense budget. 
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Eisenhower's draft of Qyezon's speech emphasized the deteriorating 
world conditions, the Filipino desire for early independence (thus the necessity 
for a greater defensive capability), and the escalating costs of raw materials.98 
Eisenhower also noted that more of the defense budget than originally planned 
was being spent on sanitation education, literacy, and vocational training. He also 
assured the nervous legislators that the standing army, a point of contention, had 
actually been reduced, and that the defense budget would not unduly impinge 
upon the people. He wrote: 
Furthermore, regardless of the aggregate authorized for the full 
development of our National Defense, the annual appropriation 
will be adjusted each year to the annual revenue, so that all other 
authorized government services and activities may develop in 
harmony with the growth of the population and the expansion of 
our culture. 99 
Clearly, if anything about the paragraph may be said to be clear, Eisenhower 
intended to leave the impression that the defense budget would not unduly encum-
ber the Filipino people. What is interesting about the paragraph was that his ability 
to use words to obfuscate, so remarked upon while president, was not accidental but 
calculated; this talent was well established and useful during his Philippine years.100 
Moreover this paragraph subtly describes Eisenhower's governmental philosophy; 
he did not think the military budget of the Philippines should be as large as it had 
become, and, even more important, that the Mission should not spend more than 
its budget allowed.101 Human services and defense should have some sort of har-
mony. For Eisenhower, the Filipinos could not defend themselves. 102 The United 
States was supposed to address deficiencies. MacArthur preferred to press the 
Filipino government to spend more money on defense. 
Although the budget increase was approved, the army had to make sacrifices. 103 
MacArthur's dream of thirty reserve divisions had to be scrapped for a more realistic 
fifteen-division plan.104 And MacArthur apparently realized that he had seriously 
offended his right-hand man. The general decided to officially make Eisenhower 
his chief of staff.105 That was fine with Ike, but it did not mollifY him. He insisted 
that MacArthur delineate his responsibilities and clarifY the organizational chart 
of the Mission. Indeed, Eisenhower wrote his own duties and asked MacArthur 
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to sign off on the list. This is not the behavior of a man confident in the wisdom 
of his boss, or intimidated by him. MacArthur signed off.106 
This decision to make Eisenhower chief of staff occurred at the same time 
that MacArthur decided to retire from the American army, which had ordered 
him to return to the United States to accept a clearly subordinate command of 
a corps area under Chief of Staff Malin Craig. MacArthur preferred his field 
marshal rank to the two stars he would wear in the U.S. Army.107 In August 1937, 
when MacArthur had received news of his recall, Eisenhower endured another 
MacArthurian rage against his enemies in the War Department, foremost among 
them, the army chief of staff.108 Surely the "Chaumont crowd" had torpedoed 
his Mission and was jealously bent on reducing his stature. 109 Craig was in fact 
opposed to MacArthur's recall, but the decision was out of his hands. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had decided. MacArthur did have political enemies, former 
High Commissioner Frank Murphy among them, who apparently believed his 
pronouncements, activities, and influence with the Philippine people in building a 
national defense system were helping to destabilize that region.110 
For our purposes, it is Eisenhower's response to MacArthur's decision that 
is instructive. Ike tried to keep MacArthur from reacting impetuously without 
knowing who or what was behind the decision. Far from being too pliant to 
confront MacArthur, or anyone else for that matter, Eisenhower's circumspect and 
balanced mind considered alternative scenarios to the general's conspiracy theory 
and offered these in an effort to conciliate, to unify, as opposed to inflaming conflict. 
Surely General Craig was an "honorable person," Ike argued.111 For Eisenhower it 
was always the team, the Mission, the defense of the United States that mattered. 
But failure to fully empathize with MacArthur's sufferings inevitably brought his 
wrath upon the voice of calm in his midst. Eisenhower wrote: 
Every time one of these tempests in a teapot sweeps the office, 
I find myself, sooner or later, bearing the brunt of the General's 
displeasure, which always manifests itself against anyone who 
fails to agree in toto with his theories and hypotheses. [underline 
Eisenhower's] no matter how astounding they may be. These comic 
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opera wars never center around any problem incident to the job we 
are on. They invariably involve something personal to the Gen.; I 
could be the fair-haired boy if I'd only yes, yes, yes!! That would be 
so easy, too!!112 
In his assessment of this tempest Eisenhower entertained the thought that he was 
complicit in MacArthur's rages, a notion that could only have fueled his determi-
nation to leave MacArthur: "The chief assistant to the Genl .... has become a (or 
maybe always has been) a master bootlicker. "113 
Even Clayton James, MacArthur's sympathetic biographer, wrote that 
MacArthur's decision to retire hurt the Mission because that institution was 
folded into the Philippine Department, its voice thus muffled in bureaucracy.114 
Eisenhower bitterly lamented that MacArthur's ego and greed had hurt the 
Mission and that the general had made the decision to retire in order to protect 
his salary and emoluments: 
From the beginning Jim and I have been practically isolated in 
thought, attitude, and intention. We did not want to come to the 
P.I. but were willing to do so because we thought we would have 
a wonderful professional opportunity. Once on the job we have 
concerned ourselves with trying to develop for this government and 
country the best possible army with the means at hand. We have 
been beset on all sides by difficulties arising from personal ambition, 
personal glorification, personal selfishness of the hot shot ( 66,000 
pesos a year and a penthouse), [MacArthur] etc., etc. When we have 
objected strenuously to measures which we believe unwise such as 
the Field Marshal-ship, the 1937 calling of20,000 trainees, the 1938 
boosting of the budget; we've been finally told to shut up.115 
For Eisenhower, all of the above decisions were a manifestation of MacArthur's 
ego, his selfishness. Moreover, they compromised the defense of the United States 
in the Far East and were thus unforgivable. In addition to Eisenhower's disdain for 
MacArthur's behavior, he continued to disagree with the general's budget. Not only 
was it unwisely raised, but it also wasted money on areas that offered poor returns. 
Worst of all, MacArthur spent more money than he had. The Philippines could not 
afford MacArthur's program.116 Eisenhower feared this ongoing financial problem 
was a brewing crisis that might boil over in 1939; he wrote, "sooner or later there 
must be a day of reckoning."117 Eisenhower believed more effort should have been 
112.lbid., 355, 356. 
113.lbid., 355. 
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made to secure equipment, money, and cooperation from the United States. It was 
clear to Ike that the Filipinos could not defend themselves. The United States must 
offer more help. MacArthur's trip to the United States to secure that help had been 
both delayed and ineffective; Ord had achieved some real results but not enough.118 
In 1938 Eisenhower would try his hand at securing American aid. 
Disgusted as Ike was with MacArthur's budget, the next blow-up with him almost 
sent Eisenhower home. Always enamored with theater and prestige, MacArthur 
decided to parade his growing army down the streets of Manila. The general hoped 
that when the Filipinos saw what a grand force their money was buying, their 
morale would be boosted and they would begin to believe, as many did not, that they 
could defend themselves. But such a parade would cost an enormous sum. Qyezon 
discovered MacArthur's plans and asked Eisenhower about them. An astonished 
Eisenhower, who had assumed Qyezon knew all about the parade, informed the 
president. Qyezon grew angry. He called MacArthur and voiced his displeasure while 
Eisenhower returned to his office. The general again blamed his subordinates for 
exceeding his orders, subordinates who had told him there was no money for such 
a display. MacArthur's massive ego, his belief that he was a man of destiny, would 
not permit him to admit a mistake.l19 MacArthur told Qyezon that he had merely 
suggested a study be done on the idea. This interpretation of what had happened was 
"certainly news to us," Eisenhower wrote. Once again MacArthur had refused to 
accept responsibility for a mistake. Three decades later Ike recalled the impact of this 
event on him: "This misunderstanding caused considerable resentment-and never 
again were we on the same warm and cordial terms."120 Though Ike's son John argues 
that his father's rift with MacArthur has been overblown, he admits that the most 
important thing Ike learned from MacArthur was to accept "blame for failure" while 
"giving credit for success to others."121 These disagreements with MacArthur often 
ended in a heated exchange; Eisenhower remembered, "Probably no one had tougher 
fights with a senior man than I did with MacArthur. I told him time and again, 'Why 
in the hell don't you fire me? Goddammit, you do things I don't agree with and you 
know damn well I don't."'122 As historian Carlo D'Este has noted, such an outburst 
risked his career. 123 Men do not take such chances, or exchange such words, without 
lasting resentment. Both men hid their antipathy well, but it was real. Eisenhower later 
told Robert Eichelberger, who served under MacArthur during World War II, that 
the parade incident was the end of his respect for MacArthur.124 
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A far worse and more personal blow soon followed. Jimmy Ord died in a plane 
crash in late January 1938 while attempting to fly into Baguio. Eisenhower felt 
Ord's death more than any other non-family loss ofhis life. He wrote ofOrd: 
Many people have lost a close companion and an intimate friend. 
I've lost this, also my right hand, and my partner on a tough job, 
who furnished most of the inspiration needed to keep me plugging 
away. With him gone much of the zest has departed from a job that 
we always tackled as a team, never as two individuals.125 
Even in the midst of deep personal grief, Eisenhower noted the loss to the team. 
In the summer of 1938 Eisenhower and his family would travel home to 
visit friends and relatives, and to get a break from the Philippine climate. He 
would also journey all the way to Washington, D.C., where he hoped to convince 
the War Department to more substantially help defend the Philippines.126 But 
before Ike left for home, he once again experienced the vicissitudes of working 
for MacArthur. 
The general again disrupted the budget by returning to his dream of training 
large numbers of men at the expense of equipment and efficiency. But he also 
adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward his top aide, listening carefully to 
Eisenhower's views and actually following some of his advice. MacArthur even 
remarked to Eisenhower that "nothing that occurs around here with respect to 
you is to be considered a precedent. In all respects you represent a special case, and 
it is my hope to keep you here a long time." Eisenhower was so astonished by the 
apparently long-lasting change that he wrote, "The atmosphere has cleared to such 
an extent that this job, at long last, has become personally agreeable to me as well 
as professionally interesting."127 
Meanwhile Qyezon and Eisenhower found several opportunities to discuss the 
army. The two men increasingly respected each other and found themselves chatting 
frequently, partly because MacArthur did not place a high priority on conversation 
with the Filipino president. Eventually Eisenhower and Qyezon discussed their 
philosophies of government and other subjects. Eisenhower explained his views 
on taxes, education, and ethics, and Qyezon did likewise. MacArthur learned of 
these discussions and of the growing respect between the two men and was not 
pleased. Indeed Qyezon may have inadvertently precipitated the general's jealousy 
when he sought to raise Eisenhower's Filipino pay by 1,000 pesos per month and 
improve his living quarters. MacArthur now ordered Eisenhower to ignore many of 
the president's invitations. By the time Eisenhower returned from his stateside trip, 
MacArthur's attitude toward him had hardened still further. But that was in the 
future. For the moment, Ike was hoping his trip home, with his wife, Mamie, and 
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John alongside, would provide both rest for himself and progress for the Mission. 
The Eisenhowers left for home in June 1938 aboard the Coolidge. 128 
Eventually Ike made his way to Washington. One scholar has argued that 
Eisenhower was disappointed with the response he received from the War 
Department, that his entreaties were largely unsuccessful as the War Department 
was still hostile to the idea of providing arms to the Philippines.129 But Ord's trip 
in 1937 had persuaded some that the Mission was doing important work, this in 
spite of rumors in Washington that the Mission's officers were unpopular among 
Filipinos, that the Philippines might be granted independence in 1939, and 
continued opposition to the Mission from a few officers in the War Department.130 
Nevertheless, by rnid-1938 the situation in the War Department had changed to 
a more favorable view of MacArthur's Mission. Eisenhower was actually pleased 
with the results of his trip.B1 Writing to MacArthur from Denver, Colorado, Ike 
reported: 
I feel that my Washington trips were very successful, and I obtained 
much information on the mortar question ... All the people I 
talked to in the War Department feel that you are making much 
more progress out there than they originally believed possible. They 
have become convinced [largely because of Eisenhower] that you 
are doing a worthwhile job, and in a fine way.132 
The Eisenhowers returned to Manila on 5 November 1938. Ike quickly 
discovered that the improved work relationship he had had with MacArthur in 
the few weeks before he left on his Washington trip had ended. In his absence, 
MacArthur had reorganized his staff, eliminated the chief of staff position that 
Eisenhower had so capably filled, and essentially marginalized Ike. Eisenhower was 
to be in charge of plans, training, and mobilization, but was not to run the Mission 
as he had been doing, and was not to have any official liaison role to Qtezon. Before 
Eisenhower had left for the United States, some Filipino legislators had talked 
about getting rid of MacArthur and asking Eisenhower to be the military adviser. 
MacArthur, prone to believe in conspiracies-particularly if they seemed directed 
against him-learned of this maneuvering and was convinced that Eisenhower 
was behind the movement. MacArthur now saw Eisenhower as disloyal and 
decided to reduce his responsibilities while retaining a lasting contempt for 
his subordinate. Ike believed MacArthur had rearranged his duties specifically 
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in order to keep him from seeing Qyezon. Eisenhower suspected MacArthur 
was afraid that he was losing "face" with Qyezon and that Ike was growing in 
stature. Eisenhower was correct that MacArthur feared losing Qyezon's respect. 
But MacArthur should have known that Eisenhower had nothing to do with the 
maneuverings of a few Filipino politicians. Indeed, when Ike learned of this plot 
he confronted those involved, saying that unless they dropped the idea he would 
request a transfer home.133 
Eisenhower wished he had never returned to the islands and bitterly 
castigated MacArthur in his diary, calling him a "d--- fool." MacArthur was 
equally venomous, calling Eisenhower a "traitor" (to MacArthur). Ike saw that 
those who did best with MacArthur were willing to flatter his imperial ego: "He'd 
like to occupy a throne room surrounded by experts in flattery."Ike was particularly 
galled that MacArthur had made these moves behind his back; he was determined 
now to leave MacArthur and the Philippines and even regretted the "campaign 
I conducted in the States to make him appear a wise counselor, an asset to the 
Philippines, and splendid man in his present post." Eisenhower had made these 
arguments in the sincere hope that more American aid and improving policies in 
the Philippine Mission, no doubt under his own influence, would lead to a better 
defense plan for the Philippines. Now, whatever aid came to the Philippines would 
not be used as it should be. More than ever, the general was determined to build 
his thirty-division reserve army, even at the expense of any semblance of a regular 
army other than a general staff and training cadres. Eisenhower lamented that 
MacArthur was "willing to scuttle anything and everything real. Will I be glad 
when I get out of this!!"134 Moreover, the essential communication between the 
Mission and Qyezon, given MacArthur's aloofness and lackadaisical work routine, 
would no doubt decline.l35 Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determined that his 
disappointment not show, that it not hurt the Mission. He wrote, "On the surface 
all is lovely, I will not give him the satisfaction of showing any resentment."136 
Perhaps this is why John Eisenhower, Ike's son, downplays the rupture between 
MacArthur and his father; the latter hid his anger well. 137 
In the midst of this upheaval, Eisenhower wrote to Major Mark Clark 
confirming his desire, mentioned in an earlier meeting with Clark during 
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Eisenhower's trip to the United States, to leave the Philippines. He asked Clark if 
it were possible to be assigned to the Third Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. 
Clark worked toward this goal. 138 
MacArthur's scheme to separate Eisenhower and Qyezon failed, and Ike's 
decision to leave ran into both Qyezon's admiration for him and army red tape. 
Qyezon and Eisenhower saw each other frequently. They both enjoyed playing 
bridge and conversation.139 Qyezon pleaded with him to stay in the Philippines 
and provided him emoluments that irritated MacArthur.140 The U.S. Army 
informed Eisenhower that his tour would not end until February 1940; the four 
months Eisenhower spent in the United States did not count toward the four-year 
overseas tour.141 For his part MacArthur seems to have forgotten his ill-usage of 
Eisenhower. Though he had told Ike he was "free to seek other assignments if he 
chose,"inJanuary of1939 he indicated his hope that Eisenhower would ask for an 
extension of his tour of three months. Eisenhower was surprised.142 
Meanwhile, Qyezon's and MacArthur's priorities separated.143 Severe labor 
unrest and political instability led Qyezon to divert defense funds to the Constabulary, 
which had once again been separated from the Philippine army in late 1938.144 
MacArthur ranted against Qyezon for every slight and indiscretion, while Qyezon's 
doubt of MacArthur's defense plan deepened.145 In agreement with Eisenhower, 
Qyezon believed that only the United States could defend the Philippines and that 
it had the responsibility to do so until independence was granted.146 He further 
accurately believed that there was little indication that it would do so effectively. 
In early 1940, after Eisenhower had left, MacArthur admitted that defense of the 
Philippines was the "ultimate responsibility" of the United States. The Philippine 
defense force was but a reserve for the U.S. Army.147 
In March 1939 Eisenhower had the opportunity to give the commencement 
address to the graduating Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) class at the 
University of the Philippines. This speech reveals the mature thought of Dwight 
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Eisenhower on the profession of arms. Preparation was one of the cherished 
ideals that Eisenhower spoke of that day. For Eisenhower, a young officer prepares 
himself through study and field exercises to be the best soldier possible. Each 
officer must cultivate the characteristics that would ensure his own success and 
that of the army: loyalty to superiors and subordinates, honesty, fairness, and "he 
must learn to make firm decisions and to accept responsibility for them without 
seeking to shift it either to superior or subordinate."148 It was up to each individual 
to pursue this course. 
Finally, Eisenhower asserted, the soldier must be subject to the civilian 
government. It was not his lot to get involved in the policies of that government, 
to complain, to disobey its dictates. He was explicit on this point: 
As members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps you are 
primarily citizens, and secondarily soldiers. In the first of these 
capacities you enjoy all the rights and privileges of any other citizen; 
in the other you are compelled to forego such of those rights and 
privileges as involve participation in the political activities, decisions 
and policies of your nation. This distinction must be meticulously 
observed, because, in a democracy, the military is and must remain 
subordinate to civil power.149 
Too many times had Eisenhower seen MacArthur involve himself in political mat-
ters, attempting to supersede the civilian authority. From the 1932 Bonus March, 
in which MacArthur ignored President Herbert Hoover's orders, to his attempt to 
force the Philippine government to spend more on defense, MacArthur power-
fully inserted himself in civilian politics.150 This was MacArthur's way; it was not 
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Eisenhower's.151 Indeed, MacArthur's behavior was contrary to the cherished ideals 
of the U.S. Army. Most army officers did not even vote; Eisenhower meticulously 
followed this tradition.t52 
Ike's talks and bridge games with Qyezon continued. On the evening of 28 
March 1939, Qyezon called Eisenhower to Malacanang, the presidential palace. 
The president was disturbed over a problem with a General Staff letter, and 
problems with the officer corps. During the course of the conversation, Qyezon 
was astonished to learn that Eisenhower was no longer MacArthur's chief of staff. 
The conversation further revealed that it had been MacArthur's idea to train the 
full complement of reservists in 1937, as opposed to spending money on officers 
and trainers and a more well-rounded military, and to make MacArthur a field 
marshal. Of course MacArthur had maintained that these decisions had come 
from Qyezon. Now it was apparent to Eisenhower that MacArthur had simply 
lied. Before the conversation ended, Qyezon promised to have Eisenhower re-
instated, if it were possible, as liaison between himself and the Mission. It took 
some time, but eventually MacArthur's unwillingness to communicate regularly 
with the government led a frustrated Secretary of Defense Jorge Vargas to insist 
that Eisenhower be reappointed to his old liaison job; MacArthur acquiesced. 153 
As we have seen, Ike was determined to leave MacArthur and the Philippines 
once the general had removed him from his role as chief of staff. Even before 
this Eisenhower had vacillated between his interesting and challenging job in the 
Philippines and his longing to serve with troops, to obtain a field command. As 
the likelihood of war approached, and his disgust with MacArthur increased, that 
decision was constantly receiving confirmation. 
In May, Major Clark delivered for Eisenhower.154 Ike never forgot the favor, 
and Clark would benefit from it in the years ahead. Ike's new orders directed him 
to the 15th Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington, effective no later than November 
1939.155 
Eisenhower was ecstatic, Qyezon did not want Eisenhower to leave and literally 
offered him a blank check to stay. Many other Filipinos shared that sentiment.156 
Eisenhower had turned down better-paying jobs in the past in order to pursue his 
dream of serving his country on the battlefield in a major war; he did it again now. 
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MacArthur protested as well, but Ike did not take him seriously. 157 Eisenhower 
was determined to leave: "I don't give a hoot who gets credit for anything in the 
P.I. I got out clean-and that's that!"158 Finally, the Eisenhowers were allowed 
to leave the Philippines in November.159 Qyezon arranged "a beautiful farewell 
luncheon," and MacArthur was gracious as his one-time chief of staff boarded the 
President Cleveland and left America's Far Eastern frontier. 160 
Eisenhower's disdain for MacArthur was not temporary, was not born of the 
heat of the moment, and was not based primarily on the larger uncontrollable 
circumstances surrounding their work in the Philippines. Eisenhower's antipathy 
was the direct result ofMac.A.rthur's decisions both in regard to Philippine defense 
and his own conduct, especially his failure to accept responsibility for his own 
decisions. Eisenhower thought many of MacArthur's decisions were dimwitted, 
and his conduct reprehensible. Moreover, Eisenhower could hold a grudge.161 
The passing of time did not soften his opinion of the general. Well over two years 
after he had left the Philippines, after he had proven himself during the Louisiana 
Maneuvers in 1941, and after Army Chief of Staff George Marshall had brought him 
to the War Department, Eisenhower still held a deeply critical view of MacArthur, a 
view he repeatedly recorded in his diary. MacArthur, who had been recalled to active 
duty with the U.S. Army in July 1941 as tensions with Japan increased, commanded 
both the Philippine Department and the army of the Philippine Commonwealth. 
On 8 December 1941, Philippine time, Japanese forces struck the Philippines. 
Within the week, Eisenhower was in Washington, summoned there in part because 
of his knowledge of the Philippines and its defense capabilities, and also because 
of a long list of interwar accomplishments.162 As deputy and then head of the War 
Plans Division, his primary concern was how best to aid the Philippines without 
compromising the ability of the United States to some day win the war.163 
On 19 January 1942 Eisenhower wrote in his diary, "In many ways MacArthur 
is as big a baby as ever. But we've got to keep him fighting."164 On 23 January 
Eisenhower described Major General Richard Sutherland, his replacement in 
the Philippines, as one of MacArthur's "bootlickers," the kind of aide MacArthur 
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preferred.165 Four days later, Eisenhower responded to a "flood of communications" 
from MacArthur. Eisenhower thought these letters betrayed MacArthur's refusal 
"to look facts in the face. An old trait of his." MacArthur wanted more resources 
for the Philippines and the Far East. Two days before, Eisenhower had written in 
his diary concerning the necessity to win in Europe first. 166 Eisenhower thought 
MacArthur could not see the big picture and was "jittery." On 3 February, Ike 
wrote, "Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I am hoping that his yelps are 
just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor. "167 A few days 
later Eisenhower recorded his irritation at having to send a long letter on strategy 
to MacArthur. The latter had sent a condescending message urging a flank attack 
that Eisenhower thought was fit only for "plebes."168 
In February, as the situation in the Philippines deteriorated, President Franklin 
Roosevelt discussed MacArthur's fate with his closest advisers. The president, 
following Marshall's advice, was convinced that the United States could not allow 
the Japanese to take MacArthur prisoner if it could be avoided. Eisenhower wrote 
the order to MacArthur to leave the Philippines. But Eisenhower himself disagreed 
with the decision. In a rare lapse of judgment, Ike allowed his own deep animosity 
toward the general to block his recognition of the obvious psychological importance 
of getting MacArthur out of the Philippines. Eisenhower believed that MacArthur 
would better serve the country by remaining at his post. He doubted MacArthur's 
ability to effectively lead a highly complex and diverse military force in the Southwest 
Pacific. Moreover, Ike believed the self-important and Caesar-like MacArthur 
would not fit well in a command structure that necessarily included presidents, 
prime ministers and a half a dozen chiefs of staff, not to mention scores of lesser 
planners.169 Finally, on 21 March Eisenhower wrote that he had "expurgated" the 
diary's previous day. He was ashamed that he had grown so angry on that page and 
so tore it out. Of course we cannot be sure what the cause of Ike's anger was, but 
the context in the diary is MacArthur's successful escape from the Philippines and 
Eisenhower's fear that the general would be able to command greater resources for 
the Far East than could safely be allocated. He wrote, "Urging us in that direction 
now will be: Australians, New Zealanders, our public (wanting support for the hero), 
and MacArthur. If we tie up our shipping for the SW Pacific, we'll lose this war."170 
Interestingly, while Eisenhower ripped out his angry page, he did not take out the 
comments noted above. Indeed, whenever Ike mentions MacArthur in his diary in 
these early days of1942 his comment is always negative, and he lets those comments 
stand. No exhaustion, no frustration, and no distraction could account for these 
repeated vituperations in the Eisenhower diaries over so many years. 
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It was well known in Washington that Eisenhower and MacArthur had parted 
on poor terms and had little use for one another. Robert Sherwood argues this 
antipathy was even a minor factor in President Roosevelt's decision in late 1943 
to keep Marshall as chief of staff instead of giving him the Overlord command. If 
Marshall had received the Overlord post, Eisenhower was to succeed him as chief 
of staff, but his relationship with MacArthur was an obstacle.171 
The mutual ill-will persisted after the war. Eisenhower's accomplishments as 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe brought out the worst in MacArthur. He 
seemed unable to abide a former subordinate rising to such heights. Oflke's military 
record he said, "He let his generals in the field fight the war for him. They were good 
and covered up for him. He drank tea with kings and queens. Just up Eisenhower's 
alley." MacArthur moved from the ridiculous to the petty when, upon learning the 
Canadians had named a mountain after Ike he remarked, "You know, it's a very 
small peak, considering the Canadian terrain."172 On another occasion he castigated 
Eisenhower's leadership in North Mrica and Europe. Echoing Field Marshal Bernard 
Montgomery he said, "the European strategy was to hammer stupidly against the 
enemy's strongest points."173 Perhaps MacArthur summed up his view ofEisenhower 
when he remarked, "best clerk I ever had."174 Eisenhower was no less caustic. In a 
casual conversation, a woman voiced her admiration for MacArthur and asked Ike if 
he knew the general. He responded, "Not only have I met him Madam, but I studied 
dramatics under him for five years in Washington and four in the Philippines."175 
In addition, Eisenhower was unsympathetic when President Truman fired 
MacArthur, his Far Eastern general, on 11 April1951. Ike remarked, "I hope he 
will not return to the United States and become a controversial figure. I wouldn't 
like it to lead to acrimony." Commenting on why Truman had fired MacArthur, 
Ike said, "when you put on a uniform, there are certain inhibitions you accept."176 
In the early 1960s Eisenhower, recalling MacArthur's behavior during the Bonus 
March of1932, said, "I told that dumb son-of-a-bitch he had no business going 
down there."177 Indeed, Eisenhower thought so little of MacArthur in part 
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because Ike believed the general reflected so poorly on the U.S. Army. He said, "I 
just can't understand how such a damn fool could have gotten to be a General."178 
Eisenhower summarized his views of his former boss when he said, "I certainly 
don't want to be put in the same class with MacArthur. What makes anyone think 
MacArthur is a great man?"179 Of course there were the occasional respectful 
comments toward one another. Both men realized a public dispute between two 
great soldiers would have served no purpose and damaged them both. Thus Piers 
Brendan was surely correct when he wrote that these cordial comments were 
"ringingly insincere expressions of mutual regard."18° 
In conclusion, Dwight Eisenhower believed that Douglas MacArthur fell 
short of the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit. 
MacArthur was more interested in his own advancement, his own prestige, his 
own ease, and hearing his own voice. MacArthur too often left relations with 
Philippine President Manuel Qyezon to chance, and was all too ready to believe 
his own superficial analysis of the relationship of the Philippines to the rest of 
the Far East. Too often MacArthur sacrificed the team-the American Military 
Mission and the Philippine army it was trying to build-to his dream of a 400,000-
man Philippine army worthy of a field marshal. Eisenhower's differences with 
MacArthur were not over the kinds of things that are later forgotten; the catalyst 
for these disagreements was a significant and philosophical disagreement over how 
best to build a Filipino army. That dispute then developed into Eisenhower's lasting 
disgust for MacArthur's command style. Particularly galling was MacArthur's 
refusal to accept responsibility for his decisions. As Supreme Allied Commander 
for Europe during World War II, Eisenhower wrote a press release before each 
major operation, to be used if the action was unsuccessful. The notes informed the 
world the operation had been a failure and that he alone was responsible.181 1he 
note he wrote for D-Day, 6 June 1944 reads: 
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a 
satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision 
to attack at this time and place was based on the best information 
available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and 
devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the 
attempt it is mine alone [italics mine].182 
Fortunately these notes were never used, but the man who wrote them 
remembered Douglas MacArthur. 
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